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It is “an essential right to have treatment.”
-

Dominican HIV/AIDS advocate, AIDS Free World
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Executive Summary
In the United States, trade policy is generally considered an economic issue. But for developing
countries like the Dominican Republic, it can be a matter of life and death.
This report, the culmination of seven months of research by students at Georgetown University
Law Center, seeks to shed light on how the intellectual property provisions of the Dominican
Republic – Central America – United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) are being
implemented in the Dominican Republic and the impact that the Agreement is likely to have on
access to medicine there.
Although intellectual property protections are just one of many factors that impact the price of
medicines, their effect can be significant. Strong intellectual property laws limit competition in
the pharmaceutical market, and, in so doing, can keep the price of medicines considerably
higher than they would otherwise be. For example, the introduction of generic HIV/AIDS
medications contributed to a 99% reduction in the price of anti-retrovirals internationally over
the last decade, and international generic competition reduced the price of the HIV/AIDS
medication KALETRA® by fifty-five percent in the Dominican Republic.
High pharmaceutical prices can be devastating for the government and individuals. They strain
already-stretched public health budgets and leave some patients with the choice of paying for
medications out-of-pocket or forgoing treatment in order to fund life’s other necessities. When
life-saving medicines are priced out of reach in developing countries, people die.
The international community addressed the balance between intellectual property protection
and public health in the 1995 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) and the Doha Declaration in 2001. TRIPS, which is binding on all members of the
World Trade Organization, mandates minimum intellectual property standards and allows for
certain “flexibilities” (e.g. parallel importation and compulsory licensing) to protect public
health. The Doha Declaration, pursued by developing countries in response to difficulties in
accessing affordable medicines, affirms the rights of states to use these flexibilities and makes
clear that TRIPS can and should be interpreted to protect public health.
In contrast, DR-CAFTA, like a number of other free trade agreements the United States has
negotiated with developing countries, imposes intellectual property protections that require
obligations beyond those required in TRIPS. These heightened obligations have limited
competition in the pharmaceutical market and resulted in increased prices for life-saving
medicines, with devastating effects on public health.
In the Dominican Republic, the cost of medicine is a concern for the government and
consumers. The Dominican government spends one-fourth of its health budget purchasing
medicines, and government health insurance only covers about one third of Dominicans. Thus,
the burden of purchasing life-saving medicines falls largely on individual Dominicans. As the
2

Dominican Republic attempts to extend health insurance coverage to all, heightened
intellectual property protections, such as those in DR-CAFTA, could increase the price of
medicines in a manner that overwhelms government efforts and leaves the burden of
purchasing life-saving medicines on individuals who often do not have the means to do so.
Further, although the Dominican Republic receives international funding, this support only
subsidizes a limited number of drugs and diseases. This assistance, though generous, may not
always be available or sufficient, and raises concerns about the ability of the Dominican
government to protect public health in the event of an interruption or decrease in aid.
Moreover, even with such funding, patients are not always able to secure the drugs they need
because of high pharmaceutical prices. For example, interviews suggested that some Dominican
HIV/AIDS patients may be kept on first-line drugs when they should be moved to expensive
second-line treatments because of cost concerns.
The Dominican government’s ability to address these public health challenges may be limited
by the promotion of stringent intellectual property protections by the U.S. government and the
multinational pharmaceutical industry. Further, concern was expressed that U.S. technical
assistance to the Dominican Republic provides information about DR-CAFTA obligations without
equal information about public health safeguards that could be implemented. Without
information about public health safeguards, DR-CAFTA could be implemented in a manner that
is potentially devastating for Dominican patients.
During the negotiations over DR-CAFTA, the United States used its strong bargaining position to
include heightened intellectual provisions such as “patent extensions,” which can lengthen the
term of a patent to compensate for administrative delays; “data exclusivity,” which limits the
use of test data by generic manufacturers in seeking marketing approval; and “patent linkage,”
which requires the agency responsible for ensuring drug safety and efficacy to also verify the
non-existence of a patent.
Similar requirements in other countries have led to delays in the introduction of generic
competition and have had devastating effects on access to affordable medicines. If these
obligations have a similar effect in the Dominican Republic, as is projected, the public health
system could be threatened and lives could be lost.
In recognition of the negative consequences that these heightened intellectual property
provisions have on developing countries, the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House
of Representatives and the Office of the United States Trade Representative announced a New
U.S. Trade Policy in May 2007. This New U.S. Trade Policy withdrew obligations on trading
partners to adopt certain heightened intellectual property obligations for pharmaceuticals and
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the Doha Declaration. The free trade agreement that the
United States signed with Peru already reflects this change in U.S. policy. Bringing Dominican
obligations under DR-CAFTA in line with this new U.S. approach is needed if the country is to
avert a public health crisis and lives are to be saved.
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To promote access to affordable pharmaceuticals in the Dominican Republic, the Georgetown
Human Rights Action/Human Rights Institute Fact-Finding Team makes the following
recommendations to the Government of the United States of America:
1. The United States should bring DR-CAFTA implementation in line with the New U.S.
Trade Policy, specifically:
a. Patent extensions for pharmaceuticals should be made optional.
b. At a minimum, data exclusivity should be limited to “a reasonable period” for
undisclosed and required data, and should protect only new chemical
entities. Data exclusivity should also be subject to an exception to protect
public health in accordance with the Doha Declaration.
c. Patent linkage systems should be optional, clearly allowing countries to place
the burden on patent holders to enforce their rights.
2. The United States should ensure that training and funding are provided in a way that
strengthens the Dominican Republic’s capacity to implement pro-public health
policies, including training on public health safeguards such as those provided in
TRIPS and U.S. law in addition to DR-CAFTA obligations.
3. The United States should publicly recognize the right of the Dominican Republic and
other trade partners to use TRIPS flexibilities consistent with U.S. commitments
under the Doha Declaration. In future negotiations, the United States should refrain
from promoting intellectual property provisions that inhibit a government’s ability to
advance public health.
To promote access to affordable pharmaceuticals in the Dominican Republic, the Georgetown
Human Rights Action/Human Rights Institute Fact-Finding Team makes the following
recommendations to the Government of the Dominican Republic:
1. The Dominican Republic should utilize TRIPS flexibilities where necessary to protect
public health. To this end, the Dominican Republic should consider:
a. Identifying public health needs that merit the use of TRIPS flexibilities.
b. Clarifying and publicizing the procedures for obtaining a compulsory license.
c. Providing training on TRIPS flexibilities to relevant government agencies and
civil society.
2. The Dominican Republic should further study and address the effects that
intellectual property laws can have on access to medicine in the Dominican Republic.
To this end, the Dominican Republic should consider:
a. Commissioning a study on access to medicine in the Dominican Republic.
b. Promoting more active involvement of health officials in trade and
intellectual property negotiations.
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I. Introduction
Each year, millions of people in developing countries die because they cannot afford
medications.1 Intellectual property rights are a key factor affecting medicine prices. While they
are intended to provide incentives for innovation, they also create limited monopolies that
allow high prices to be set and maintained for life-saving drugs.2 As the United States presses
for more stringent intellectual property protections in free trade agreements,3 it has a moral
obligation to consider the life and death impact of its trade policy.
The struggles of individuals in the Dominican Republic are representative of the challenges
faced by many in the developing world. Public health is just one of the many burdens
governments bear. With limited resources stretched to cover pressing concerns ranging from
crime control to clean water, developing countries like the Dominican Republic are often unable
to provide their citizens with the medications they desperately need4 and many Dominicans are
forced to pay for their own treatment costs.5 In 2001, the Dominican Republic enacted social
security reform legislation intended to provide universal health coverage to all Dominican
citizens.6 As the social security system covers more citizens and diseases, the Dominican
government may be overwhelmed by the price of medications, thereby forcing private citizens
to continue to pay for their own treatment.7 Patients may have to make difficult decisions such
as choosing between medicine and food.8
Unfortunately, individuals in developing countries like the Dominican Republic are often the
least able to afford the medication they need. Because a typical Dominican woman earns less

1

See World Health Assembly, Public health, innovation and intellectual property, W.H.A. 60.30, at ¶ 3, 66nd Ass.
(May 24, 2007) (“[A]ccess to medicines … is hampered by … lack of resources and prices that are beyond the reach
of many in the developing world.”).
2
Medecins Sans Frontieres, The impact of patents on access to medicines, http://www.msfaccess.org/main/accesspatents/introduction-to-access-and-patents/the-impact-of-patents-on-access-to-medicines/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
3
See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Facts: USTR’s Mission to Protect U.S. Intellectual
Property Rights, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file285_13523.pdf at
¶ 2 (Nov. 2007) (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
4
See Josh Ruxin, et. al., Emerging Consensus in HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and access to essential
medicines, 365 LANCET, 618, 618 (2005) (“[P]oorest countries face enormous hurdles to achieving the Millennium
Development Goals for health, let alone the broader goal of health for all their citizens.”).
5
See MAGDALENA RATHE, ET AL., MEDICAMENTOS Y PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL: EVALUACION DEL IMPACTO DE LOS
NUEVOS ESTANDARES DE DERECHOS DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL EN EL PRECIO DE LOS MEDICAMENTOS: EL CASO DE
LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA, at 20 (2009).
6
See Ley No. 87-01, Ley que crea el Sistema Dominicano de Seguridad Social, Santo Domingo, Dominican
Republic, 2001.
7
See discussion infra Part III.
8
Interview with nurse, Buen Samaritano Hospital, January 14, 2010, La Romana, Dominican Republic (on file with
authors). See also Disease Control Priorities Project, Ensuring Supplies of Drugs and Vaccines in Developing
Countries, Without Medicines Patients Die Needlessly, http://www.dcp2.org/file/220/dcpp-drugsandvaccinesweb.pdf (Oct. 2008) (last visited March 6, 2010) (“[I]n most developing countries, consumers typically pay out of
pocket for drugs, often sacrificing months or years of income to get well….”).
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than $200 USD per month9 and likely has no health insurance,10 a diagnosis of Hepatitis B would
be crippling to her health and her family. In Santo Domingo, the cost for a standard Hepatitis B
treatment is $337.11 USD per week (over $19,400 USD for a full course).11 Thus, a Dominican
woman like the one described may be forced to find a way to pay for a drug that costs over
seven times her annual income.12 Without treatment, she will face liver failure and death.
Although patients may not know why their medicines are so expensive, intellectual property
rights can dramatically affect drug prices.13 With this relationship in mind, intellectual property
laws should be enacted with the understanding that innovation incentives must be balanced
with the public interest in using and benefitting from new products and processes. 14 Though
desirable, these innovation incentives do not negate the need to accommodate public health
concerns. Rather, public health should be a key consideration in setting optimal levels of
intellectual property protection.
In 2007, the United States shifted its trade policy partly in recognition that certain types of
intellectual property provisions, though perhaps incentivizing innovation, can undermine public
health.15 This shift in trade policy (“New U.S. Trade Policy”) imposes less stringent protections
on other developing countries. The Dominican Republic, however, has not been offered similar
provisions.
This report analyzes the impact of intellectual property protection on access to medicines in the
Dominican Republic, with a specific focus on the provisions of the Dominican Republic-Central
American-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).16 As the United States successfully
advocates for higher levels of intellectual property protection,17 developing countries risk
detrimentally shifting the delicate balance between intellectual property and public health and
burdening those least able to pay. The right to the highest attainable standard of health is
9

This extrapolation is based on statistical data from the Oficina Nacional de Estadìstica, available at
http://www.one.gob.do/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
10
In 2002, only 21% of Dominicans were covered by some type of health insurance. PAN-AMERICAN HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, HEALTH SYSTEMS PROFILE: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 19 (3rd ed. Oct. 2007) [hereinafter PAHO].
11
Interview with health official, Secretaria de Estado de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social (SESPAS), January 14,
2010, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors). According to the official, treatment for Hepatitis
B in the Dominican Republic is Pegasys, a drug produced by Roche, and the weekly cost of Pegasys is about
$347.11 USD (12,600 RD) per week required for 56 weeks Id. The exchange rate used is 1 USD = 36.3000 RD.
12
Calculation based on the cost of Pegasys for one year ($337.11 USD per week x 52 weeks = $17,529 USD)
divided by total income ($2400 USD).
13
United Kingdom Comm‟n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Final Report,
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm, at Ch. 2, 36 (Sept. 12, 2002) (last visited Mar.
6, 2010) (“The importance of prices of medicines to poor consumers in developing countries is perhaps obvious.”).
14
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (intellectual property designed to “[p]romote … progress”).
15
See discussion infra Part IV.
16
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004 [hereinafter DRCAFTA] available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republiccentral-america-fta/final-text.
17
See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Intellectual Property, http://www.ustr.gov/tradetopics/intellectual-property at ¶¶ 1-3 (noting that the Office “uses a wide range of bilateral and multilateral trade
tools to promote strong intellectual property laws and effective enforcement worldwide”).
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internationally recognized as one of the fundamental rights of every human being. 18 While the
Dominican Republic currently faces severe resource constraints and struggles to provide its
citizens with the medications they desperately need, the effects of DR-CAFTA could have
potentially deadly results. Increasing intellectual property protections at the expense of public
health comes at a legal, moral and possibly mortal cost.
A. The Human Right to Health
The right to the highest attainable standard of health is internationally recognized as one of the
fundamental rights of every human being. Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights provides that “*e+veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and his family, including . . . medical care . . . .”19 Similarly, Article 12
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes “the
right . . . to the . . . highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” 20 The right to
health may implicate related human rights, including the right to life, education, work and the
benefits of scientific progress.21
The right to health and related human rights are inextricably connected with the right to
affordable medicines. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which interprets
the ICESCR, has indicated that the right to health includes economic accessibility. 22 Such an
obligation means that “health facilities, goods and services must be affordable for all” and
“poorer households should not be disproportionately burdened with health expenses. . . .” 23
The Dominican Republic has legal obligations with respect to the right to health. On January 4,
1978,24 the Dominican Republic acceded to the ICESCR and, as such, is bound by its provisions
that require progressive realization of the right to health for its citizens.25 Thus, the Dominican
Republic must take steps toward the full realization of the right to health and refrain from

18

See discussion infra Part I.A.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, Art. 25(1), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
20
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, Art. 12, U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
21
Access to medicine may also implicate the right to “life,” “education,” and “work,” UDHR, supra note 19, at Art.
3, 25(1), 23 (right to “life,” “education, and “work), ICESCR, supra note 20, at Art. 15 (right to the benefits of
scientific progress), and the rights of the child, Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res 44/25, U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989) (right to the benefits of scientific progress).
22
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, ¶ 12 (b), 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
23
Id.
24
See United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en, at
Dominican Republic (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
25
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, at Art. 11 (May 23, 1969) (“The
consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature … or accession.”).
19
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adopting laws or policies that would diminish the availability or affordability of medicines.26 As
a party to the ICESCR, the Dominican Republic has three duties in relation to the right to health:
1) to “respect,” or refrain from interfering directly or indirectly, with the right to health; 2) to
“protect” the right to health, which includes taking steps to ensure that non-state actors do not
interfere with the right to health; and 3) to “fulfill” the right to health through appropriate
legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures.27
The United States signed the ICESCR in 1977 but has not ratified it,28 and therefore must refrain
from acts that “defeat the object and purpose of *the+ treaty.”29 In addition, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the Highest Attainable Standard of Health has indicated that developed
countries should not encourage developing countries to accept intellectual property standards
that do not provide public health safeguards, especially in the context of a bilateral or
multilateral trade agreement.30 This obligation can reasonably be interpreted to prohibit
signatories like the United States from attempting to constrain the ability of states to address
pressing public health challenges through free trade agreements.
Thus, in addition to moral responsibilities, both the Dominican Republic and the United States
have legal obligations with respect to the right to health.31 Findings in this report raise
questions about whether such obligations are being met.
B. Methodology
The Georgetown Human Rights Action/Human Rights Institute Fact-Finding Team, a group of
nine students and two professors from the Georgetown University Law Center, conducted a
fact-finding mission in the Dominican Republic. The primary goal of the mission was to
determine how DR-CAFTA is being implemented in the Dominican Republic and the potential
future impact of the Agreement on the right to health. Although factors ranging from
26

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, ¶ 32 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000). (“[T]here is a strong presumption
that retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to health are not permissible.”). [hereinafter CESCR].
27
Id. at ¶ 39. (“States Parties should ensure that the right to health is given due attention in international agreements
…. In relation to the conclusion of other international agreements, States Parties should take steps to ensure that
these instruments do not adversely impact on the right to health.”)
28
See United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 24, at United States.
29
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 25, at Art. 18. Though the United States is not a party to
the Vienna Convention, its provisions have been recognized the Department of State as customary international law.
Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT‟L. L. 431,
443 (2004).
30
Paul Hunt & Rajat Khosla, The human right to medicines, 8 INT‟L J. HUM. RTS., 98, 105 (June 2008) (“In the
context of medicines, this responsibility means that no rich State should encourage a developing country to accept
intellectual property standards that do not take into account the safeguards and flexibilities included under the
TRIPS agreement. In other words, developed States should not encourage a developing country to accept „TRIPSPlus‟ standards in any bilateral or multilateral trade agreement.”)
31
See World Health Organization, Comm‟n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Innovation and Public Health, Public
health, innovation and intellectual property right: report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
Innovation and Public Health, at 9 (2006) (“The moral obligation [to provide access to medicines for all] is backed
by a legal imperative.”).
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discrimination to quality of medications affect health in the Dominican Republic, the project
focused exclusively on intellectual property rights. The mission’s focus was selected by the
members of the student group Georgetown Human Rights Action from a number of student
proposals. Team members were selected from applications solicited from the student body as a
whole. Funding for the project was provided by the Human Rights Institute at the Georgetown
University Law Center.
The Team spent the fall semester of 2009 studying relevant international intellectual property
agreements, Dominican and U.S. law, and international human rights law. The Team also
interviewed representatives of civil society and academia in the United States, who consulted in
the development of the research project.
The “fact-finding” occurred primarily during interviews conducted from January 11th through
January 15th, 2010, in Santo Domingo and La Romana, Dominican Republic. In total, the Team
interviewed fifty-two individuals in the Dominican Republic, including patients, healthcare
providers, American and Dominican government officials, members of non-governmental
organizations, representatives from the multinational and domestic pharmaceutical industries,
and Dominican lawyers. Interviews were generally held in the interviewee’s office or in a health
care facility. Informed consent was obtained for all interviews.
Interviews Conducted in the Dominican Republic
January 11 to January 15, 2010

Upon returning to the Washington, D.C., the Team consolidated its findings and recommendations into
this report.
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II. Intellectual Property & Public Health
Increased intellectual property protections, such as those in DR-CAFTA, can raise the price of
medicines.32 Upward pressure on drug prices is particularly devastating in developing countries,
such as the Dominican Republic, where resources are limited and purchasing high-priced
pharmaceuticals can divert funding from other pressing priorities.33 Although intellectual
property is only part of a broad set of issues that affect access to medicines, 34 its impact on
price remains a serious concern.
Intellectual property rights are legal monopolies over creations of the mind.35 Patents may be
the most recognized form of intellectual property protection, but this protection comes in a
number of different shapes and sizes.36 Regardless of the specific type of intellectual property
right, all such rights operate by excluding competition, and thereby allow patent-holding
companies to charge higher prices than those that would exist on an open market. 37
Pharmaceutical companies argue that their high prices are justified to reimburse investment in
discovery,38 but the actual cost of developing a new medicine is contested and may not be as
high as industry claims.39 A recent study shows that U.S. pharmaceutical companies spend twice
as much on marketing as on research and development.40 And, in 2008, the pharmaceutical
industry’s profits were nearly twice that of the oil and gas industry.41 Although high prices may
create powerful incentives for creation, they also act as barriers to the right to health by placing

32

United Kingdom Comm'n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, supra note 13, at 37.
See Carsten Fink, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: an Economic Perspective, in The Global Debate on the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights and Developing Countries, Issue Paper No.22, at xv (ICTSD, 2009).
34
See, e.g., World Health Organization, supra note 31, at 6 (noting that health outcomes depend on many factors
such as economic growth, income distribution, nutrition, education, public health measures, and medicine).
“[I]nnovation for „medicines and other products‟ must be situated within a wider picture of efforts across sectors to
improve health and development.” Id. at 7.
35
See Earl W. Kintner & Jack L. Lahr, An Intellectual Property Law Primer 7–11 (Clark Boardman Company, Ltd.
1982) (1975).
36
See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV.B.
37
World Health Organization, supra note 31, at 20 (noting that the validity of justification for patents is contextspecific because “where most consumers of health products are poor … the monopoly costs associated with patents
can limit the affordability of patented health-care products required by poor people in the absence of other measures
to reduce prices or increase funding”).
38
Companies claim that the research and development of a successful drug costs between 800 million to one billion
dollars. Brochure from Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Drug Discovery and Development:
Understanding the R&D Process 10 (2007), available at
http://www.innovation.org/drug_discovery/objects/pdf/RD_Brochure.pdf.
39
See Bob Young & Michael Surrusco, Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against the Drug Industry’s R&D Scare Card,
PUBLIC CITIZEN CONGRESS WATCH 2-12, July 2001, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF.
40
Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion
Expenditures in the United States, 5-1 PLoS Medicine 29, 32 (Jan. 2008) (discussing the disparity in estimates of
money spent on research and development and estimating that more than twice is spent on promotion as is spent on
research and development).
41
See Fortune 500, Top industries: Most profitable,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2009/performers/industries/profits/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
33
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medicines beyond the reach of many people in developing countries.42 Serious moral and legal
questions may be raised when life-saving drugs cost many times a person’s annual income.
The connection between intellectual property obligations and public health has been vigorously
debated by civil society, industry, and international organizations.43 Two major international
documents address intellectual property rights and public health concerns: the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)44 and the Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health (Doha Declaration).45 Whether these international documents achieve an
appropriate balance between intellectual property rights and public health is a matter still
widely debated.46 However, when the international community or individual states introduce
additional obligations that go beyond TRIPS and that contravene the flexibilities for public
health that are affirmed under the Doha Declaration, such as in the case of DR-CAFTA, the
consequences can be dire. The high prices for medicines that may result can be a death
sentence to impoverished individuals in developing countries.
A. TRIPS: Establishing International Intellectual Property Standards
TRIPS, signed in 1995,47 introduced minimum international intellectual property standards.
Because the agreement falls under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO), its
obligations are imposed on all WTO members and thus it has an exceedingly far reach. 48 TRIPS,
largely the result of U.S. efforts,49 marked the first time that states were required to patent
pharmaceutical products and processes.50 Prior to TRIPS, governments had broad flexibility to
adopt the intellectual property regimes of their choosing and many states excluded
pharmaceuticals from patentability.51 Thus, subjecting life-saving medicines to a twenty-year

42

See Médicins Sans Frontières, Drug Patents Under the Spotlight: Sharing Practical Knowledge about
Pharmaceutical Patents, http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4913e/s4913e.pdf, at 2 (March 2003); see also
CESCR, supra note 26, at ¶ 12 (b).
43
See Peter M. Gerhart, Symposium: The International Intellectual Property Regime Complex: The Tragedy of
TRIPS, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 145 (2007) (addressing the “diverse” literature on international intellectual
property law that has “grown enormously” since TRIPS and revolves around the topics of efficacy and fairness).
44
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
45
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/11, 41 I.L.M. 746
[hereinafter Doha Declaration].
46
See Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations: The WTO as a Distributive Organization, 17 AM. U. INT‟L L. REV.
1045, 1079-81 (2002) (arguing that the Doha Declaration “tips the balance of the WTO toward flexibility and
recognition”).
47
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
48
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, Intellectual property: protection and
enforcement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
49
DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES AND
MATERIALS 270-71 (2006).
50
Id.
51
Id.
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patent monopoly was a dramatic shift in international intellectual property protection. 52
However, in an attempt to balance these new obligations, TRIPS also recognizes the right of
states to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health,”53 and grants considerable
freedom in implementing intellectual property provisions through so-called “TRIPS
flexibilities.”54 These flexibilities legally allow states to provide for the public health of their
citizens.55 For example, states have some flexibility in how they define what inventions meet
the criteria to obtain a patent.56 Members are also allowed to determine whether or not to
permit parallel imports, the import of a patented good that was originally sold with the
permission of the right-holder in another country.57 Finally, members may choose to allow
compulsory licensing, by giving a third party, such as a generic drug manufacturer or
government, the right to use a patented product or process without authorization from the
patent owner subject in most cases to adequate remuneration and other conditions. 58 These
flexibilities are designed to allow states to implement intellectual property provisions in a way
that does not undermine the right to health.59 DR-CAFTA, negotiated in 2004, significantly
erodes the ability to utilize these flexibilities by requiring intellectual property protections that
go beyond a country’s TRIPS obligations.60
B. Doha Declaration: Reinforcing TRIPS’ Public Health Commitment
Although TRIPS guaranteed the use of some public health safeguards, developed countries like
the United States continued to pressure developing countries to strengthen intellectual
52

See ELLEN F.M. ‟T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY POWER: DRUG PATENTS,
ACCESS, INNOVATION, AND THE APPLICATION OF THE WTO DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 7
(AMB Publishers 2009).
53
TRIPS, supra note 44, at Art. 8(1).
54
See J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT‟L L. & POL. 11, 28 (1997) (concluding that TRIPS “leaves developing countries ample „wiggle
room‟ in which to implement national policies favoring the public interest in free competition”); JAYASHREE
WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (2001) (highlighting the
“constructive ambiguity” in TRIPS).
55
See James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Heath Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291, 301 (2002) (indicating that the language of the
Doha Declaration, “cast in terms of members‟ rights to protect public health introduces an interpretation not
expressly provided in the TRIPS Agreement”).
56
See TRIPS, supra note 44, at Art. 27(1). Patents must be available for products or processes that are “new, involve
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.” Id. However, the meaning and level of “inventive” could
differ between Member States, creating room for flexibility in interpretation.
57
See id. at Art. 6.
58
See id. at Arts. 30-31. Generally, compulsory licenses are thought to fall under Article 31. See, e.g., Christopher
Garrison, Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries, ISSUE PAPER NO. 17 at 2 (UNCTAD - ICTSD
Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development 2006). However, use under Article 30 is also without permission of
the right holder. See TRIPS, supra note 44, at Art. 30.
59
See Doha Declaration, supra note 45 at ¶ 4 (“[T]he TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members
from taking measures to protect public health… we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.”).
60
See generally DR-CAFTA, supra note 16; see also World Health Organization, supra note 31, at 22 (identifying
the “growing number of bilateral and free trade agreements which include higher standards of protection that erode
these flexibilities”). See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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property protections and refrain from using these flexibilities to protect public health. 61 Many
of these pressure tactics, such as trade disputes and litigation in Brazil, Thailand, and South
Africa, garnered high-profile media criticism.62 In the wake of these controversies, developing
countries used the 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar as a platform to bring
access to medicines to the forefront of the World Trade Organization.63
The resulting binding interpretative text, the Doha Declaration, affirms the sovereign right of
governments to fully utilize TRIPS flexibilities, including compulsory licensing and parallel
importation, to protect public health.64 The Declaration states that TRIPS can and should be
interpreted to protect public health and promote access to affordable medicines.65 However, in
the years since the Declaration, developing countries have been subjected to pressure in the
form of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, like DR-CAFTA, that increase intellectual
property rights at the expense of public health.66
C. Competition: Driving Down Drug Prices
Competition in pharmaceutical markets generally lowers the price of medicines.67 For example,
the introduction of generic anti-retroviral medication to treat HIV/AIDS is credited with
contributing to the 99% reduction in the cost of HIV/AIDS treatments over the past decade. 68
With the introduction of competition, brand-name manufacturers are forced to lower prices in
order to maintain a profitable market share.69

61

„T HOEN, supra note 52, at 20-24. Contra Press Release, Office of United States Trade Representative [hereinafter
USTR], USTR Zoellick says World has Chosen Path of Hope, Openness, Development and Growth (Nov. 14, 2001)
(noting that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative immediately praised the Declaration as a “landmark
political declaration” and “a good example of developed and developing nations advancing common goals”).
62
„T HOEN, supra note 52, at 21-29.
63
See Gathii, supra note 55, at 296.
64
Doha Declaration, supra note 45, at ¶ 4-5.
65
Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.
66
See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV‟T. REFORM, 109D CONGRESS., TRADE AGREEMENTS AND ACCESS TO
MEDICATIONS UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, at 6 (Comm. Print 2005) (finding that “contrary to the Doha
Declaration, U.S. trade negotiators have repeatedly used the trade agreements to restrict the ability of developing
nations to acquire medicines at affordable prices”).
67
Theodore C. Bailey, Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Licensing in the Development and
Distribution of HIV/AIDS Drugs, 2001 I.L. TECH. & POL‟Y 193, 204 (2001). “The difference between a
monopolistic and a competitive market can have a profound effect on the price of a drug, as evidenced by the drastic
drop in price that occurs when patent protection for drugs cease.” Id.
68
Medecins Sans Frontieres, supra note 2, at ¶ 4.
69
Id. at ¶¶ 2-4 (“The most effective and sustainable way to bring down the price of a drug is through competition
between manufacturers.”).
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The Effects of Generic Competition70
Cost of Triple-Combination AIDS Treatment May 2000 - August 2001

Compulsory licensing is one tool that harnesses the power of competition to break the lock of
intellectual property monopolies and lower the price of medicines. For example, the Dominican
government could grant a compulsory license to a third party, such as a generic drug
manufacturer, to produce Hepatitis B or HIV/AIDS medication.71 The patent holder would
receive some payment for the license72 and the additional production source would inject
competition into the market, which may reduce high medicine prices. 73 The Dominican
government has never issued a compulsory license, though it has considered doing so in the
past.74

70

Data from Médecins Sans Frontières (2001) “A matter of life and death: The role of patents in access to essential
medicines” http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2001/doha_11-2001.pdf (last visited Mar.
22, 2010). The graph depicts the effect of generic competition on the lowest world price per patient per year of
stavudine (d4T) + lamivudine (3TC) + nevirapine triple combination therapy.
71
„T Hoen, supra note 52, at 39.
72
TRIPS, supra note 44, at Art. 31(b).
73
See Bailey, supra note 67, at 204.
74
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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KALETRA®in the Dominican Republic:
Competition Through Compulsory Licenses
In the Dominican Republic, the price of KALETRA® (Lopinavir/Ritonavir), an HIV/AIDS
medication produced by Abbott Laboratories, dropped by approximately 55% with the
introduction of international generic competition in the form of a compulsory license.
Currently, 70% of HIV patients in the Dominican Republic use the drug combination in
KALETRA®. When the Dominican government began purchasing KALETRA® from the patent
holder, the average price internationally was $183 USD per month of treatment, an amount
equivalent to an average Dominican’s monthly income. However, after a compulsory license
was issued by the Thai government in 2007, the price was reduced to $83 USD as a result of
indirect competition.
Sources: Medicins Sans Frontiers: Untangling the Web – lopinavir/ritonavir (LPV/r) ,
http://utw.msfaccess.org/drugs/lopinavir-ritonavir (last visited March 21, 2010), Press Release, World Health
Organization, WHO Welcomes Abbott's Decision to Reduce the Price of Second-Line Antiretroviral Therapy (Apr. 10,
2007).

Increasing intellectual property protections could result in the Dominican Republic being unable
to take advantage of international generic competition. Pharmaceutical companies only face
competition in countries where intellectual property provisions allow generic alternatives.75 For
example, Abbott Laboratories reduced the price of KALETRA® in the Dominican Republic when
faced with a Thai compulsory license.76 Had KALETRA® been patented in the Dominican
Republic, the price of KALETRA® could have remained prohibitively high because Abbott would
not have been forced to compete with the generic alternative.77 Thus, if attention is not paid to
domestic intellectual property protections, Dominicans may not reap the benefits of generic
competition internationally.
The negative ramifications of overly protective intellectual property laws exist despite
differences between the Dominican pharmaceutical manufacturing market and that of the
developed world. Because of limitations in the Dominican market such as small size and the
presence of branded generics (i.e. generic pharmaceuticals with advanced marketing
campaigns),78 some Dominican-produced generics may not realize the same low price levels as
unbranded or internationally-produced generics.79 Thus, addressing intellectual property
75

THE WORLD BANK, BATTLING HIV/AIDS: A DECISION MAKER‟S GUIDE TO THE PROCUREMENT OF MEDICINES
AND RELATED SUPPLIES 112 (Yolanda Tayler, ed., 2004) (“If a medicine or supply is not protected by intellectual
property rights (such as a patent) in the country of importation, intellectual property rights will not constitute an
obstacle for the procurement authority.”).
76
See discussion infra KALETRA® in the Dominican Republic: Competition Through Compulsory Licenses
77
See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 75, at 12 (“If generic medicines are available from foreign suppliers, this does
not necessarily mean that they can be lawfully imported because the originator may hold a patent “in-country” and
may try to use it to block importation.”).
78
Interview with representative of the generic industry, Industrias Farmacéuticas Dominicana (INFADOMI),
January 11, 2010, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors).
79
See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 384-85 (Thompson South-Western 2007). The use
of brand names allows manufacturers to differentiate their products and charge a higher price than they could charge
for undifferentiated goods. Id.
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protections internationally, particularly in generic source countries like India and Brazil, is
critical.80 However, although a complete solution must be international, intellectual property
protections in the Dominican Republic are an important piece of the public health puzzle. When
countries like the Dominican Republic increase their intellectual property protections, they can
cease to be able to import lower-priced generics that may be available on the international
market.

80

See e.g., Medicines Sans Fronteirs, People Living with HIV/AIDS: India must not sacrifice us in trade agreement
with Europe, Press Release, http://www.msfaccess.org/media-room/press-releases/press-releasedetail/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1604&cHash=bc2335a5ff, at ¶ 4 (Mar. 12, 2010) (last visited Mar. 15, 2010) (“As the
source of 92 percent of the AIDS medicines used in developing countries today, India is the pharmacy of the
developing world. So the impact of [a potential free trade agreement between India and the European Union] also
stretches far beyond India….”).
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III. An Increasing Burden: The Struggle to Provide Dominicans with
Medicines
Although Dominicans face a number of challenges that impact the right to health,81
unaffordable medicines are a major concern for patients, health care professionals and the
government.82 Over eighty percent of spending on pharmaceuticals is paid for out of pocket by
Dominican patients.83 According to one doctor, “*patients+ have enough money to find out
what is wrong with them and what medicines they need but not enough money to buy
[medications]. . . . *S+ometimes they can’t afford the whole course of medicine so they just buy
*enough medication for+ a day or two.”84 Even with private health insurance coverage, one
patient suffering from anemia was forced to pay $100 USD for ten iron injections. 85 Though her
treatment calls for daily injections, she can only afford to take them every other day. 86 Because
the price of medications can be a life and death matter, countries should consider the public
health implications of their trade policy.
A. The Dominican Government
In an attempt to better manage the many burdens on the Dominican health system, the
Dominican Republic passed health reform legislation 87 and created a social security system to
provide universal health insurance coverage to Dominican citizens.88
Although the 2001 legislation tasked the Dominican government with providing universal social
security by 2012,89 less than one-third of Dominicans are currently covered.90 Despite the fact
that not all Dominicans are covered, the government already spends one-quarter of its health
budget on pharmaceuticals.91 With expanded social security coverage, that amount will need to
drastically increase, or patients will be forced to forego treatment. Further, each patient is
81

See Ruxin, supra note 4, at 620. Patients and civil society also indicated that Dominicans suffer from a number of
barriers such as lack of health system infrastructure, stigmatization, etc. Interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, Red
Dominicana de Personas que Viven con VIH/SIDA (REDOVIH), January 12, 2010, Santo Domingo, Dominican
Republic (on file with authors).
82
Interview with health official, Comisión Ejecutiva para la Reforma del Sector Salud (CERSS), January 14, 2010,
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors).
83
See RATHE, supra note 5, at 20.
84
Interview with nurse, Buen Samaritano Hospital, supra note 8.
85
Interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, REDOVIH, supra note 81.
86
Id.
87
See Ley No. 42-01 Ley General de Salud, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 2001, Art. 127-129; PAHO,
supra note 10, at 29. The law created the Sistema Nacional de Salud (SNS) (national health system), Plan Básico de
Salud (PBS) (basic health plan), and Seguro Familiar de Salud (family health insurance program).
88
See Ley No. 87-01, supra note 6.
89
RATHE, supra note 5, at 22; see also PAHO, supra note 10, at 29.
90
Interview with social security official, El Seguro Nacional de Salud, January 15, 2010, Santo Domingo,
Dominican Republic (on file with authors). Currently, only 3 million (out of 10 million people) are covered. Id.
While the Social Security system has not yet covered all Dominicans the roughly 30% of the population covered by
the program is a significant increase from the 5.4% covered in 1996. See PAHO, supra note 10, at 19. In the same
year, only 12.4% of Dominicans had private health insurance coverage. Id.
91
RATHE, supra note 5, at 20.
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currently limited to roughly $90 USD per year for drug purchases, an amount often insufficient
when dealing with life-threatening diseases.92 Thus, out-of-pocket expenses for Dominicans
may remain significant regardless of the success of Dominican social security.
The Dominican government will face even greater burdens as chronic diseases like cancer and
heart disease become increasingly common in addition to infectious diseases like dengue fever
and tuberculosis.93 Because chronic diseases often require long treatments with drugs that are
protected by intellectual property laws, providing medicines to treat these conditions can be
extremely expensive.94 For example, a full course of breast cancer drugs costs over $33,000
USD in the Dominican Republic.95 A Dominican health official characterized the amounts spent
on such high-cost chronic diseases as unsustainable.96
The high price of medicine is a common thread that runs through the health challenges the
Dominican Republic faces. The inability to pay for high-priced pharmaceuticals forces
healthcare providers, government and individuals to make heart-breaking choices.


One healthcare provider indicated that her hospital “didn’t even want a mammogram
machine until *the facility+ could offer cancer drugs.”97



An official with the Dominican government pointed to waiting lists for some of the most
expensive medications that treat life-threatening diseases and are prohibitively
expensive for most Dominicans. The waiting lists were implemented because the
government could not afford to provide medicines for all patients in need.98



Further, the few patients lucky enough to qualify for government assistance for
catastrophic diseases such as cancer must travel two to three times a month to Santo
Domingo for their medications. These trips can be especially burdensome because
patients may have to travel long distances while severely ill with only limited funds to
pay for such travel. The frequent trips are necessary because high prices mean that the
limited drugs the Dominican government can purchase must be carefully rationed.99



A cancer patient in Santo Domingo stated that she was only able to pay for her first

92

Id. at 23.
PAHO, INDICADORES BASICOS DE SALUD, REPUBLICA DOMINICANA 2008 5 (2008). Infectious diseases caused
over ten percent of deaths in men and women in 2005. Id. at 4. HIV/AIDS is of particular concern, with an estimated
rate of 5.5 persons infected per 100,000 in 2007, and much higher rates in tourist areas such as Puerto Plata, which
has an incidence of 24.6 persons infected per 100,000 citizens. Id. at 9. Worldwide, deaths from chronic diseases are
projected to be more than two times the death rate from communicable diseases by 2015. WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, supra note 31, at 4.
94
Interview with health official, SESPAS, supra note 11.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Interview with nurse, Buen Samaritano Hospital, supra note 8.
98
See interview with health official, SESPAS, supra note 11.
99
Id. See also interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, La Junta Directiva de Coalición, January 12, 2010, Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors).
93
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course of treatment with the help of family and friends. “*I+t was a big sacrifice for them
. . . I hated to be a burden . . . because they have their own commitments.” 100


Other patients are forced to choose between feeding their families and treating their
illness.101 One healthcare provider characterized it as a losing proposition between
“*buying+ medication and buying lunch.”102

The Efavirenz Dilemma
Efavirenz (EFV) is the generic name of an important antiretroviral drug for HIV treatment
produced by Bristol-Myers Squibb and Merck under the brand name SUSTIVA® and
STOCRIN®. Interviews in the Dominican Republic report that EFV is patented. Because EFV
is patented, the Dominican Republic cannot benefit from lower prices internationally.
Brand-name EFV costs over three times more than the generic version
available internationally.
Because the Dominican government cannot afford to purchase EFV on the limited funds
provided by international donors, it purchases nevirapine (NVP), a drug similar to EFV but
whose price has decreased dramatically as a result of generic competition. However, NVP
may cause life-threatening liver damage and weaken the immune system if given to some
patients too early in the progression of their disease.
One Dominican health official remarked that EFV is the preferable treatment because the
government can initiate potentially life-saving treatment sooner and it avoids safety
concerns associated with NVP.
Because the government is forced to supply NVP, Dominican patients wait longer to begin
treatment for HIV/AIDS, leaving patients with immune systems that are potentially
weakened. These standards of initiating treatment for HIV/AIDS are lower in the Dominican
Republic than standards set in World Health Organization guidelines and in developed
countries.
Source: Interview with health official, Comision Ejecutiva para la Reforma del Sector Salud, in Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 14, 2010 (on file with authors); Rapid Advice: Antiretroviral
Therapy for HIV Infection in Adults and Adolescents 10-11, World Health Organization (November
2009).

100

Interview with patient, Instituto Oncológico, January 15, 2010, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file
with authors).
101
See United Kingdom Comm‟n on Intellectual Prop. Rights, supra note 13, at 36 (“[I]f a sick person has to pay
more for a pharmaceutical product as a result of a patent, it means that he or she will have less to spend on other
essentials of life such as food or shelter.”).
102
Interview with nurse, Buen Samaritano Hospital, supra note 8.
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B. International Donors
International funding currently plays a critical role in keeping the Dominican health system
afloat. This funding heavily subsidizes a limited number of medications. In particular, the Global
Fund finances the purchase of most HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis medications in the
Dominican Republic.103 Although such funding is beneficial, there are serious questions about
the long-term sustainability of this model.
First, international assistance covers only a limited number of medications and diseases.
Dominicans face diseases that can be just as deadly as those singled out by international donors
such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.104 To a Dominican patient who is dying of Hepatitis
B, for example, international assistance is of little comfort. Even patients who benefit from
receiving free HIV/AIDS medications do not receive all the medications they need. Specifically,
international aid provides only a limited amount of medication for the opportunistic infections
that are often part and parcel of HIV/AIDS.105 Therefore, international assistance cannot be the
only solution to the problem of high-priced medicine.
Second, the medications selected for international funding are often limited due to price
concerns. It has been reported that one way the Dominican government may be controlling the
cost of medications that treat more advanced stages of AIDS, is by limiting the testing of
HIV/AIDS patients.106 By testing these patients less frequently, those who should be receiving
more advanced treatment may be forced to wait for appropriate medication even though their
immune systems may be more compromised.107 In addition, HIV/AIDS patients in the
Dominican Republic are reportedly kept on first-line drugs, where generic competition exists,
when they should be moved to more expensive second and third-line treatments.108 Although
103

See The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,
http://www.theglobalfund.org/programs/grant/?compid=158&grantid=239&lang=en&CountryId=DMR.
[hereinafter Global Fund]. The Dominican Republic has received Global Fund grants since 2004, and six grant
recipients have requested a total of $179,983,639 USD to date. Id. Thus far, the Global Fund has approved funding
of $108,121,868 USD to combat the spread of these infectious diseases in the Dominican Republic. Id.
104
See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the impact of the increasing prevalence of chronic diseases in the
Dominican Republic).
105
Interview with representative, Consejo Presidencial del SIDA (COPRESIDA), January 14, 2010, Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors).
106
Interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, Alianza Solidaria para la Lucha contra el VIH/SIDA (ASOLSIDA), January
13, 2010, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors).
107
See Médicins Sans Frontières, HIV/AIDS Treatment: Optimize Now, or Pay More Later…,
http://www.msf.ca/news-media/news/2009/07/hiv-aids-treatment-optimize-now-or-pay-more-later/, at ¶ 4 (Jul. 20,
2009) (“Unlike older first-line drugs, most second- and third-line drugs are patented and priced out of reach for
patients in developing countries.”); see also National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, How HIV Causes
AIDS, http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/topics/HIVAIDS/Understanding/howHIVCausesAIDS/, at ¶¶ 1-2 (“HIV destroys
CD4 positive (CD4+) T cells, which are … crucial to maintaining the function of the human immune system. As
HIV attacks these cells, the person infected with the virus is less equipped to fight off infection and disease …
Antiretroviral medicines can help reduce the amount of virus in the body, preserve CD4+ T cells and dramatically
slow the destruction of the immune system.”).
108
See interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, REDOVIH, supra note 81; see interview with HIV/AIDS advocate,
ASOLSIDA, supra note 106 (discussing how the Dominican Republic uses CD4 levels, an immune system indicator
used to tell when a patient should be moved from first-line medicines to a more aggressive treatment, is set at a
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the consequences of such actions can mean death,109 patients may not be given the best
possible medicines because affordably-priced generics are not available. Thus, even
international assistance is forced to contend with the barrier of price.
Finally, international funding may not always be available to the Dominican Republic. One
government attorney working on health reform efforts noted that there is no guarantee that
the Global Fund will renew its grants.110 And a health official acknowledged that the Dominican
government will be responsible for providing medicines for these diseases when assistance
ends or is interrupted.111 Significant doubts exist about the government’s ability to adequately
compensate for a loss of international assistance.112 One HIV/AIDS advocate recalled how civil
society scrambled to find funds in anticipation of providing anti-retroviral medication when
international funding renewal appeared to be in jeopardy in 2009.113 Further, according to
some interviews, the Dominican government has been forced to borrow medicines from poorer
countries like Haiti or purchase medicines at a higher price from the name-brand manufacturer
to ensure continued treatment.114 One Dominican HIV/AIDS advocate stated that “*i+f
international funding runs out, treatment runs out.”115
International assistance is a double-edged sword. Although it plays a critical role in saving the
lives of Dominicans, if funding were stopped or decreased, the consequences could be dire.
Because the Dominican government cannot rely on unlimited international aid, it must find its
own solution to the problem of life-saving medicines priced out of reach.

lower level than international standards: “CD4 testing is set at 250 in the Dominican Republic while the
international standard is 350”).
109
Médicins Sans Frontières, supra note 107, at ¶ 3 (discussing the need for “robust first-line treatment” and “access
to affordable second- and third-line treatment combinations” and noting that “[n]one of this is happening now,
which means that thousands of patients are back on AIDS death row.”).
110
Interview with attorney, Comision Ejecutiva para la Reforma del Sector Salud, January 13, 2010, Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors) (“When the Global Fund ends, we are supposed to get
continuation grant – but what does that guarantee? This is a topic of public health.”).
111
Interview with health advisor, Executive Branch of the Dominican Republic, January 13, 2010, Santo Domingo,
Dominican Republic (“[W]hen the Global Fund runs out it will fall on us [to fill this void].”).
112
Interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, REDOVIH, supra note 81; interview with HIV/AIDS advocate,
ASOLSIDA, supra note 106 (noting that the government would not treat access to medicines as a priority).
However, some expressed a belief that the government would be able to compensate for a reduction in international
assistance because demand for second- and third-line treatments is not significant for some diseases such as
tuberculosis. Interview with tuberculosis advocate, Asociación Dominicana Pro-Bienestar de la Familia, January 12,
2010, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (on file with authors).
113
Interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, AIDS Free World, January 11, 2010, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
(on file with authors).
114
Interview with health official, CERSS, supra note 82. According to a leading HIV/AIDS advocate, a shipment of
generic anti-retroviral medication from India was delayed in 2009, and the Dominican government was forced to
borrow medicines from Haiti to ensure continued treatment. Interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, REDOVIH, supra
note 81.
115
Interview with HIV/AIDS advocate, REDOVIH, supra note 81.
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IV. U.S. Pressure: Compounding the Price Problem
Despite its commitment to the Doha Declaration,116 the United States has pursued free trade
agreements, like DR-CAFTA, that increase intellectual property levels117 and, in the process,
threaten to undermine access to medicines. In some instances, these increased obligations are
being implemented in ways that are even more stringent than the highly developed intellectual
property protections in the United States.118
DR-CAFTA is expected to increase pharmaceutical prices in the Dominican Republic over the
next two decades,119 which will likely undermine the Dominican government’s efforts to
provide life-saving medicines and force individual Dominicans to continue purchasing medicine
at unaffordable prices. Ultimately, U.S. promotion of heightened intellectual property
protections could exacerbate existing public health difficulties in the Dominican Republic.
As a staunch advocate of strong intellectual property protections, the United States uses a
variety of approaches to pressure countries to increase levels of intellectual property
protection.120 These tactics often exploit the disparities in bargaining power caused by the
dependence of many developing countries, like the Dominican Republic, on trade with the
United States.121 During DR-CAFTA negotiations, this dependence resulted in the Dominican
government accepting TRIPS-plus intellectual property provisions.122 Today, the United States
continues to promote these already heightened obligations through training and technical
assistance that fails to inform the Dominican government of the more public health conscious
approaches it may take, including those the United States itself employs.123 These intellectual
property efforts favor multinational pharmaceutical companies at the expense of public health
and may be interfering with the Dominican Republic’s ability to uphold the right to health of its
citizens.
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Despite this pressure on the Dominican Republic to accept and implement heightened
intellectual property provisions in DR-CAFTA, the United States has recognized that these
provisions have negative consequences for developing countries and undermine the public
health protections affirmed in the Doha Declaration.124 Partly in recognition of these negative
consequences, the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives and the
Office of the United States Trade Representative revisited pending free trade agreements to
substantially revise some of these standards and reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the Doha
Declaration.125 This change in policy (“New U.S. Trade Policy”) has been offered to Colombia,
Peru, and Panama in free trade agreements that incorporate these more favorable provisions in
addition to revised labor and environmental provisions.126 Dominicans, however, do not benefit
from the New U.S. Trade Policy and are forced to implement heightened intellectual property
obligations that are no longer in line with U.S. policy and may have negative consequences for
public health.
A. Unequal Partners: The Non-Negotiation of Intellectual Property in DR-CAFTA
The Dominican government negotiated DR-CAFTA with one primary goal: preserving its vital
trade relationship with the United States.127 This trade imbalance is reflected in the reliance of
the Dominican Republic on the United States as a market.128 According to one former DR-CAFTA
negotiator, as the Dominican government watched Central American countries enter further
into free trade negotiations with the United States, it became fearful of losing U.S. market
share to its neighbors and joined negotiations.129
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Further weakening the Dominican government’s bargaining power was the late stage at which
it began trade discussions. Negotiations between the United States and the Dominican Republic
lasted just three months,130 largely because the other participating Central American countries
had already completed a substantial portion of the agreement.131 Several former DR-CAFTA
negotiators reported that Dominican negotiators were relatively inexperienced.132 One noted
that “we needed handholding as a country and as negotiators *during this process+.” 133 Further,
DR-CAFTA’s intellectual property provisions were not negotiated until the final round, which
may have influenced Dominican acquiescence to unfavorable terms because negotiators did
not want to risk provisions on textiles and sugar that had already been agreed upon. 134 The

130

Press Release, USTR, U.S. & Dominican Republic Conclude Trade Talks Integrating the Dominican Republic
into CAFTA, at ¶ 7 (March 15, 2004)
131
See SICE Foreign Trade Information System, Central America-Dominican Republic-United States,
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/USA_CAFTA/USA_CAFTA_e.ASP (last visited Mar. 6, 2009). (listing the
participating Central American nations: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua).
132
Interview with former DR-CAFTA negotiator, supra note 127; interview with former DR-CAFTA negotiator for
intellectual property and telecommunications, supra note 127.
133
Interview with former DR-CAFTA negotiator, supra note 127.
134
See SONIA GUZMÁN DE HERNÁNDEZ, LA INTRAHISTORIA DEL DR-CAFTA 113 (Corripio 2006); interview with
former DR-CAFTA negotiator, supra note 127. But see former DR-CAFTA negotiator for intellectual property and
telecommunications, supra note 127 (asserting that the Dominican Republic was able to negotiate some changes in
the form of a few amendments, notes, and side letters even if they were unable to make large changes to the text).

24

enticement of these benefits and inexperience of the negotiators may have prevented the
Dominican Republic from negotiating significant changes in intellectual property provisions.
The United States acknowledged that it would pursue heightened intellectual property
protections in DR-CAFTA.135 These protections have been characterized as some of the most
onerous among other U.S. free trade agreements with developing countries,136 and surpass
obligations under TRIPS.137 Yet, despite the United States’ stated desire to include heightened
intellectual property protection, parties to DR-CAFTA signed a Memorandum of Understanding
as part of the Agreement stating that DR-CAFTA’s intellectual property chapter does not affect
a country’s ability to take “necessary measures to protect public health by promoting access to
medicines for all.”138
Although the legal effects of this Memorandum are untested, U.S. activities during and after
DR-CAFTA negotiations call into question its commitment to the document’s principles. One DRCAFTA negotiator reported that the United States focused on protecting the multinational
pharmaceutical industry during the negotiations.139 Since the negotiation of DR-CAFTA, the
United States has provided technical assistance on DR-CAFTA implementation that may not
fully embrace or inform the Dominican Republic about safeguards that could be implemented
to address public health concerns. By promoting policies that may raise the price of medicines
in the Dominican Republic, the United States may be interfering with the Dominican Republic’s
ability to realize the right to health for its citizens.
B. Beyond TRIPS, Beyond the New U.S. Trade Policy: DR-CAFTA Intellectual Property
Provisions
DR-CAFTA imposes several intellectual property provisions that go beyond those contained in
TRIPS and the New U.S. Trade Policy. These provisions could negatively affect public health in
the Dominican Republic and are compounded by U.S. technical assistance on DR-CAFTA
implementation that may not present the public health safeguards present in U.S. law to the
Dominican government. Without these safeguards, Dominican law may sometimes go beyond
highly developed U.S. intellectual property law. This combination of DR-CAFTA provisions and
U.S. technical assistance could drive up the price of medicines in a way that is devastating for
the lives of many ordinary Dominicans.
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This report focuses on three DR-CAFTA provisions that impose obligations beyond TRIPS: 1)
patent extensions, 2) data exclusivity, and 3) patent linkage.140 In examining these provisions,
comparisons are made between the Dominican law implementing DR-CAFTA,141 TRIPS and U.S.
law. These comparisons show that the Dominican Republic may be missing opportunities to
implement intellectual property protections in a manner that protects the right to health.
1. Patent Extensions
Patent extensions increase the protected term of a patent.142 Extensions are designed to
compensate for government delays in granting a patent application or approving a drug for
market.143 Compensation is given by extending the patent holder’s monopoly over the
pharmaceutical product.144 However, by extending this monopoly, a patent extension further
delays the entry of competition into the market and, thus, may keep prices artificially high. 145
The patent extension provision in DR-CAFTA imposes obligations on the Dominican Republic
that exceed those contained in TRIPS. Although TRIPS requires that patent protection be given
for twenty years, it makes no reference to patent extensions. DR-CAFTA, however, requires
patent extensions be given for delays in granting a patent application or marketing approval.146
Thus, the patent extension provision in DR-CAFTA creates additional protections for
pharmaceutical companies not contemplated by TRIPS.
U.S. law contains patent extension provisions similar to those in DR-CAFTA, but with important
limits. For example, in the United States, the total protective term of a patent given a patent
extension for a regulatory delay cannot exceed fourteen years from marketing approval, 147
while this limit does not exist in Dominican law.148 Thus, the Dominican law implementing DRCAFTA may not protect public health to the same degree.
The problem of patent extensions is particularly acute in developing countries. In the United
States, it takes over three years on average to complete the patent application process.149 In
developing countries like the Dominican Republic, which have far fewer resources at their
140
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disposal than the United States,150 administrative delays in the patent office and drug
regulatory authority are not uncommon.151 Thus, patent extensions impose a double burden on
developing countries by effectively punishing them for their lack of resources by extending
monopolies that increase drug prices and further strain government budgets.
Patent extensions affect public health by forcing patients to wait even longer than the twentyyear term established by TRIPS for generic medicines and the competition they bring to the
market.152 DR-CAFTA has not been in effect long enough in the Dominican Republic to see how
patent extensions will be granted and their impact.153 However, the United States has
recognized the potential negative consequences of patent extensions, which are now optional
for developing countries under the New U.S. Trade Policy.154 Unfortunately, the Dominican
Republic has yet to benefit from this favorable shift in policy.
2. Data Exclusivity
Data exclusivity is a form of intellectual property protection for pharmaceutical safety, efficacy
and quality data.155 Before a pharmaceutical can be sold, data from clinical research trials must
typically be submitted to a country’s drug regulatory authority to show safety, efficacy and
quality.156 Generally, when a generic manufacturer wants to enter the market, the
manufacturer relies on this data to show that its drug is similarly safe and effective. 157 But, data
that is protected by an exclusivity regime cannot be used or relied upon by a third party, such
as a generic manufacturer, for a period time.158 If generic manufacturers cannot rely on this
data, they must either wait until the data exclusivity expires or hold their own clinical research
trials, which are often prohibitively expensive and can raise ethical questions by duplicating
150
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unnecessary testing on human beings for commercial purposes.159 Thus, data exclusivity
prevents generic manufacturers from entering the market, providing competition and driving
down prices.
Data exclusivity is completely independent from patents and creates an additional layer of
monopoly protection.160 Whereas patents reward innovation, data exclusivity rewards
investment and effort.161 Protecting data is particularly problematic in developing countries
because brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers typically attempt to sell their products in
developed markets like the United States before attempting to extract profit from developing
countries.162 A pharmaceutical manufacturer could wait until patent protections or data
exclusivity in developed countries expired, and then use data exclusivity to receive an
additional term of monopoly in developing countries like the Dominican Republic. 163 The result
is that the developing nations, which have the greatest need for lower cost drugs, may have to
wait the longest to obtain them.164
Data exclusivity provisions in DR-CAFTA can be characterized as exceeding those in TRIPS.165
TRIPS requires countries to protect undisclosed data from unfair commercial uses and certain
types of disclosure.166 TRIPS leaves governments with broad discretion in implementing data
protection regimes,167 and, consequently, allows for public health considerations.168 The United
States, however, has chosen to adopt a more extensive data exclusivity regime that flatly
requires five years of protection for new products containing a new chemical entity and three
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years of protection for new uses or indications.169 It has attempted to promote this more
extensive data exclusivity regime in other countries through free trade agreements like DRCAFTA.170 Under DR-CAFTA, data submitted for regulatory approval is given at least five years of
protection regardless of the purpose of its use.171 Further, some products that do not contain a
new chemical entity are protected when they would not be under TRIPS. 172 Thus, where
generics would have an opportunity to enter the market under TRIPS (e.g. under a compulsory
license) DR-CAFTA could unilaterally prohibit entry for at least five years. This extension of the
monopoly may have life or death consequences for patients who are unable to obtain lowerpriced medicines.
Studies show that one of the main factors in increasing the price of medicines in developing
countries is data exclusivity.173 Perhaps unsurprisingly then, interviews with individuals who
work with intellectual property and pharmaceuticals revealed that data protection is the most
contentious of the three DR-CAFTA provisions studied in this report.174
Recognizing in part the problematic nature of data exclusivity provisions for developing
countries, the New U.S. Trade Policy contains a TRIPS-plus data exclusivity obligation that is
more amenable to public health concerns.175 For example, under New U.S. Trade Policy, data
exclusivity is limited to new “chemical entities” rather than a new “product,”176 a distinction
that limits the pharmaceuticals that qualify for protection.177 Additionally, the period of data
exclusivity is shifted from “at least five years” to a reasonable period, normally five years.178
Further, the New U.S. Trade Policy establishes a public health exception that authorizes
countries to take measures to protect public health notwithstanding data exclusivity. 179 These
changes in U.S. policy significantly improve the balance between economic incentives and
public health considerations over the provisions contained in DR-CAFTA.
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3. Patent Linkage
Patent linkage refers to a system where drug regulatory bodies are linked with patent
enforcement.180 If a drug is patented, the drug regulatory agency generally cannot approve the
generic version of the drug for purchase and must inform the patent owner that someone else
has tried to obtain approval to sell the drug.181 Most linkage systems require the drug
regulatory authority to determine whether a patent exists for a drug before granting marketing
approval to sell that drug.182 Though patent linkage mechanisms can be designed in different
ways, designing a linkage system that does not unduly impair a generic manufacturer’s ability to
place drugs on the market can be difficult for developing countries. 183
Unlike DR-CAFTA, TRIPS does not require a country’s drug regulatory body to be linked with
patent enforcement. DR-CAFTA imposes an increased burden on the Dominican drug regulatory
authority by requiring it to 1) refrain from granting marketing approval of a patented drug
during the term of the drug’s patent, and 2) notify the patent owner of a generic
manufacturer’s request for marketing approval.184 By requiring these two actions by the drug
regulatory authority, the linkage system required by DR-CAFTA places the burden of patent
enforcement on the Dominican government to protect the patent rather than on the patent
owner.185
Although the United States adopted a patent linkage system,186 U.S. law contains significant
safeguards that can be used to protect public health.187 For example, U.S. law requires patent
owners to identify and list patents in the publicly available Orange Book, a public database
where patents and data exclusivity are listed,188 and to affirmatively enforce their patent in
court after being informed of a generic manufacturer’s attempt to gain marketing approval.189
An additional safeguard under U.S. law incentivizes generic production by limiting marketing
approval delays of generic products to no more than thirty months.190 Further, the U.S. law
provides for an even greater incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge the validity of
patents by rewarding a generic manufacturer that successfully challenges a patent with 180
days to exclusively sell their generic product.191 Even though the U.S. patent linkage system has
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faced criticism for hindering generic competition,192 these flexibilities in U.S. law are an
example of the highly developed nature of U.S. intellectual property law that tries to establish a
balance between patent holders and consumers.193
In contrast, the Dominican Republic has implemented only one of these flexibilities in
Dominican law: establishment of a public register that lists patented pharmaceutical
products.194 A generic manufacturer in the Dominican Republic does not have similar
mechanisms contained in U.S. law to challenge the patent in order to accelerate generic
marketing approval. Without the opportunity and incentive for generic manufacturers to
challenge patents under Dominican law, the drug regulatory authority may assume that patents
are valid and block the marketing approval of a drug even if the patent is likely invalid. 195 By
failing to implement critical safeguards, the Dominican Republic creates a complex patent
linkage system that will impose administrative and legal burdens that could provide patent
holders with more protection than under U.S. law.196
Recognizing the unique burdens patent linkage places on drug regulatory authorities in
developing countries, the New U.S. Trade Policy reverses the trend of tasking drug regulatory
agencies with enforcing patents.197 Under the New U.S. Trade Policy, patent holders must be
notified that another person seeks to market a product covered under the patent.198 After this
notification, the patent holder may be required to seek enforcement to prevent marketing
approval of the allegedly infringing product.199 Thus, the burden of patent enforcement is
placed on the patent holder to seek available remedies, and not on the drug regulatory
authority to enforce patents.200 Further, provisions in recent free trade agreements explicitly
recognize that generic manufacturers can challenge pharmaceutical patent validity or
applicability.201 These changes in U.S. policy significantly improve the balance between patent
holders and public health from the provisions contained in DR-CAFTA.
192
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C. Beyond TRIPS, Beyond the New Trade Policy: DR-CAFTA Implementation
Despite the change in U.S. trade policy, the United States continues to promote the use and
enforcement of TRIPS-plus provisions in the Dominican Republic that go beyond obligations in
U.S. law and the New U.S. Trade Policy.202 This promotion largely occurs through the United
States Agency for International Development (“USAID”), which funds, selects and hires
consultants to provide training and guidance to Dominican authorities on DR-CAFTA
implementation.203
The Dominican generic industry in particular expressed concern that this USAID guidance is
biased towards interpreting and implementing DR-CAFTA in a way that promotes strong
intellectual property protection without providing equal information about safeguards that can
be used to promote public health.204 This bias could be critically damaging if decision-makers in
the Dominican Republic are not aware of the legal flexibilities to protect public health that exist
in U.S. law. Demonstrating this lack of knowledge, Dominican government officials expressed
confusion about the requirements needed to issue a compulsory license.205 And, many of those
interviewed were unaware of public health safeguards that exist in U.S. law or the New U.S.
Trade Policy.206 Without accurate education and balanced training about what DR-CAFTA
provisions require, the Dominican government may choose not to use pro-public health
flexibilities, which limits the government’s ability to respond to public health needs.
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Although the willingness to provide financial assistance and capacity-building is commendable,
the United States loses credibility by directing Dominican authorities how to implement
Dominican law without providing balanced information about flexibilities that the Dominican
Republic can use to protect the public’s health.

The Pharmaceutical Industry: Regional Lobbying
Dominican government officials report that powerful pharmaceutical companies
also attempt to influence Dominican policy in ways that could undermine the right
to health.
In 2009, the Dominican Republic and eight Central American countries considered
organizing a regional drug purchasing program for thirty-six high-priced drugs.
Because each country has little individual purchasing power, the regional drug
purchasing program would have enabled the countries to pool their resources for
additional bargaining and purchasing power with multinational pharmaceutical
companies. This effort was supported by the finding that only thirteen drugs
consume ninety percent of the region’s public health budget.
In response to these efforts, a pharmaceutical lobbying organization sent a letter to
the government of each country questioning the strategy and arguing that these
measures might violate international and national legal obligations. The lobbying
organization, FEDEFARMA, represents companies such as Eli Lilly, Merck, Sanofi
Aventis and Pfizer.
Sources: Letter, 2009 PAHO Reunión del Sector Salud de Centroamérica y República Dominicana (on file with
authors)
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V. Forecasting the Effects of DR-CAFTA in the Dominican Republic
TRIPS-plus provisions such as those found in DR-CAFTA can profoundly impact access to
medicines.207 The experience of other developing countries is illustrative. Jordan, for example,
experienced a twenty percent increase in the price of pharmaceuticals five years after its free
trade agreement with the United States.208 Prices in Jordan were two to ten times more for
some new medicines than those in Egypt, a market which was not subject to heightened
intellectual property provisions imposed by U.S. free trade agreements, after its free trade
agreement with the United States.209 In Guatemala, DR-CAFTA decreased competition by
forcing some generics off of the national market and delaying the entry of new generics into
the market even when those generic medicines were available in the United States.210 Research
indicates that the Dominican Republic is also likely to experience an increase in pharmaceutical
prices because of DR-CAFTA.211
The price of pharmaceuticals in the Dominican Republic is expected to increase by nine to
fifteen percent by 2027 as a result of DR-CAFTA based on a recent study by Fundación Plenitud
and the Pan-American Health Organization.212 The majority of this price increase is attributed to
the effects of data exclusivity.213 With increasing prices under DR-CAFTA, the Dominican
government may face significant difficulty in providing its citizens with the medications they
need.
Such an increase in prices could be deadly for Dominican patients who are affected in many
different ways. A nurse in the Dominican Republic explained that patients currently cannot
afford to take “anything that is non-generic” on a daily basis.214 Even though HIV/AIDS
medicines are largely free for patients in the Dominican Republic, HIV/AIDS advocates noted
that doctors delay some HIV/AIDS testing because “if *a doctor+ doesn’t prescribe drugs, he
saves the government money.”215 Despite the fact that the Dominican Republic receives mostly
free HIV/AIDS medicines through international donors, more advanced patients require more
expensive treatment which may not have been accounted for in the Dominican health budget
or grants from international donors.216
Dominican government officials and civil society also expressed concern about the sustainability
of the Dominican Republic’s public health programs if prices increase as projected.217 One
health official noted that the Dominican government currently spends over $10 million USD on
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pharmaceuticals that treat chronic diseases, and that this spending is unsustainable. 218 Other
countries that have implemented heightened intellectual property provisions as a result of free
trade agreements with the United States faced similar problems. For example, in Jordan, the
rise in pharmaceutical prices has threatened the sustainability of public health programs. 219 The
Dominican government could also be forced to spend resources on training and the
implementation of TRIPS-plus provisions to the detriment of other public health needs. Patent
linkage, for example, forces the Dominican drug regulatory agency to spend resources on
patent verification and notification. This burden is in addition to its public health
responsibilities, which include assuring the safety, efficacy and quality of pharmaceuticals. 220
With scarce resources, the implementation of DR-CAFTA itself further strains the Dominican
budget from health priorities and requires additional resources to ensure that DR-CAFTA is
implemented in a way that safeguards the right to health.
Outdated TRIPS-plus provisions in DR-CAFTA could critically limit the Dominican Republic’s
ability to uphold the right to health for its citizens. Further, price increases threaten to
overwhelm the Dominican government’s efforts to implement meaningful social security
protection for its citizens. Without such reform, Dominican citizens will continue to struggle to
pay for drugs they cannot afford. Though the United States has extended more favorable
intellectual property provisions to other developing countries, Dominicans do not currently
benefit from this shift in U.S. trade policy. Instead, Dominicans will face rising drug prices under
DR-CAFTA.221 The Dominican Republic should also be able to benefit from these less stringent
intellectual property provisions that better allow developing countries to uphold the right to
health.
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VI. Conclusion
The Dominican Republic will face increasing difficulties in protecting public health because of
the heightened intellectual property provisions in DR-CAFTA and its implementing legislation.
The human right to health, as contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, creates obligations for both the United States and the Dominican Republic.
Heightened intellectual property provisions in DR-CAFTA and subsequent state practices may
implicate the moral and legal obligations of both countries to uphold the right to health.
Currently, the Dominican Republic is unable to provide medications for all citizens. More than
eighty percent of spending on pharmaceuticals is out of pocket despite an often inadequate
average annual income of about $3000 USD.222 And, although the Dominican government is in
the process of attempting to increase insurance coverage for its citizens, the public health
budget is already strained and the medicine expenditure for each patient may be insufficient
for many,223 raising further questions about the reform’s viability. Further, the Dominican
government relies heavily on international donors to provide for some life-saving medicine, a
reliance that likely cannot be sustained.224
The future may not be more promising: the effects of DR-CAFTA have the potential to
exacerbate these current pressing public health challenges. The TRIPS-plus intellectual property
provisions in DR-CAFTA will likely have a profound impact on access to medicines and may
hinder efforts by the Dominican Republic to protect public health. These provisions could
significantly limit the Dominican Republic’s ability to safeguard public health through
internationally recognized legal flexibilities that were guaranteed under TRIPS and reaffirmed
by the Doha Declaration. These provisions could also limit generic competition, allowing
pharmaceutical companies to set and keep prices of new and already expensive drugs
artificially high. Consistent with studies from other countries on the effects of TRIPS-plus
provisions, the provisions in DR-CAFTA will likely increase pharmaceutical prices in the
Dominican Republic.
The consequences of TRIPS-plus provisions, like those in DR-CAFTA, have been recognized as
harming developing countries by keeping lower priced drugs from those who need them.225
Under the New U.S. Trade Policy, developing countries have been offered more favorable
intellectual property provisions which make patent extensions optional and allow for a more
flexible data exclusivity and patent linkage regime.226 Despite this recognition that heightened
intellectual property provisions undermine public health protection, the United States’ policy in
222
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the Dominican Republic has not similarly shifted. Further, U.S. technical assistance in the
Dominican Republic may undermine the balance between intellectual property protections and
public health by failing to provide information about pro-public health safeguards that could be
implemented in Dominican law.
The United States has the capacity to save lives in the Dominican Republic by promoting a propublic health trade policy. With this capacity comes the moral responsibility to consider the life
and death impact of intellectual property provisions on Dominicans. Our recommendations
provide possible ways to address this critical issue and alleviate this significant burden on the
Dominican Republic.
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VII. Recommendations
To promote access to affordable pharmaceuticals in the Dominican Republic, the Georgetown
Human Rights Action/Human Rights Institute Fact-Finding Team makes the following
recommendations to the Government of the United States of America:
1. The United States should bring DR-CAFTA implementation in line with New U.S.
Trade Policy, specifically:
a. Patent extensions for pharmaceuticals should be made optional.
b. At a minimum, data exclusivity should be limited to “a reasonable period” for
undisclosed and required data, and should protect only new chemical
entities. Data exclusivity should also be subject to an exception to protect
public health in accordance with the Doha Declaration.
c. Patent linkage systems should be optional, clearly allowing countries to place
the burden on patent holders to enforce their rights.
2. The United States should ensure that training and funding are provided in a way that
strengthens the Dominican Republic’s capacity to implement pro-public health
policies, including training on public health safeguards such as those provided in
TRIPS and U.S. law in addition to DR-CAFTA obligations.
3. The United States should publicly recognize the right of the Dominican Republic and
other trade partners to use TRIPS flexibilities consistent with U.S. commitments
under the Doha Declaration. In future negotiations, the United States should refrain
from promoting intellectual property provisions that inhibit a government’s ability to
advance public health.
To promote access to affordable pharmaceuticals in the Dominican Republic, the Georgetown
Human Rights Action/Human Rights Institute Fact-Finding Team makes the following
recommendations to the Government of the Dominican Republic:
1. The Dominican Republic should utilize TRIPS flexibilities where necessary to protect
public health. To this end, the Dominican Republic should consider:
a. Identifying public health needs that merit the use of TRIPS flexibilities.
b. Clarifying and publicizing the procedures for obtaining a compulsory license.
c. Providing training on TRIPS flexibilities to relevant government agencies and
civil society.
2. The Dominican Republic should further study and address the effects that
intellectual property laws can have on access to medicine in the Dominican Republic.
To this end, the Dominican Republic should consider:
a. Commissioning a study on access to medicine in the Dominican Republic.
b. Promoting more active involvement of health officials in trade and
intellectual property negotiations.
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APPENDIX I. Organizations Consulted in the Dominican Republic
Hospitals and Clinics
- Hospital El Buen Samaritano, La Romana, Dominican Republic
- Hospital General Plaza de la Salud, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
- Instituto Oncológico, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
Dominican Government
- Comisión Ejecutiva para la Reforma del Sector Salud (CERSS)
- Consejo Presidencial del SIDA (COPRESIDA)
- Consejo Nacional de Salud (CNS)
- Presidencia de la Republica
- La Dirección de Comercio Exterior (DICOEX)
- Oficinia Nacional de la Propiedad Industrial (ONAPI)
- La Programa de Medicamentos Esencial/ Central de Apoyo Logístico (PROMESE-CAL)
- Secretaria de Estado de Relaciones Exteriores (SEREX)
- Secretaria de Estado de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social (SESPAS)
- El Seguro Nacional de Salud (SENASA)
United States Government
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
- United States Commercial Service (USCS)
Industry Representatives
- Asociación de Industrias Farmacéuticas Dominicana (INFADOMI)
- Asociación de Representantes de Importadores de Medicamentos (ARAPF)
Non-Governmental Organizations
- AIDS Free World
- Alianza Solidaria para la Lucha contra el VIH/SIDA (ASOLSIDA)
- Asociación Dominicana Pro-Bienestar de la Familia (PROFAMILIA)
- Consejo Presidencial del SIDA (COPRESIDA)
- La Junta Directiva de Coalición
- Fundación Plenitud
- Fundación Global Democracia y Desarollo (FUNGLODE)
- Fundación Grupo Paloma
- Red Dominicana de Personas que Viven con VIH/SIDA (REDOVIH)
Other Professionals
- Dominican legal practitioners, trade negotiators, medical practitioners, government
consultants.
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APPENDIX II. Comparison of Intellectual Property Provisions
Patent Extensions:

TRIPS
DR Law
DR-CAFTA
Agreement No. 20-00

DR Law No. 424-06

U.S. Hatch Waxman Act

No patent
extensions.

Art. 15.9(6)(a)-(b)

Art. 2:

35 U.S.C. § 156

Patent term extensions due to
delays in regulatory review: an
extension of the patent term shall
be granted to compensate the
patent owner for unreasonable
curtailment of the effective patent
term resulting from a delay in the
marketing approval process.

Patent term extensions due
to delays in regulatory
review: the term of a patent
shall be extended for
unreasonable delays in
regulatory review, defined as
more than 2.5 years since
the request for marketing
approval.

Patent term extensions due to delays in
regulatory review: the portion of the patent
term during which the patentee is unable to
market product while awaiting government
approval is restored.

No patent
extensions.

Patent term extensions due to
delays in the grant of a patent: the
term of a patent shall be extended
to compensate for unreasonable
delays that occur in granting the
patent. Unreasonable delay shall
at least include a delay in the
issuance of a patent of more than
5 years from the date of filing of
the application, or 3 years after a
request for examination of the
application has been made,
whichever is later, provided that
periods attributable to actions of
the patent applicant need not be
included in the determination of
such delays.

Patent term extensions due
to delays in the grant of a
patent: the term of a patent
shall be extended for
unreasonable delays in the
granting of a patent, defined
as more than 5 years from
filing or 3 years from the
request of examination,
whichever is later.
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35 U.S.C. § 154
Patent term extensions due to delays in the
granting of a patent: the portion of patent
term during which the patentee is unable to
market the product while awaiting
government approval if more than 3 years
from filing is restored. Exceptions: delay
requested by the applicant, interference
procedure, appeals, etc.
Conditions & Limitations:
- Applicant must file the request with the
U.S. patent office within 60 days of the
product approval by the agency.
- Only one 5 year extension period can be
sought per product.
- The restoration period cannot be longer
than five years and the total effective patent
protection, including the restoration period,
must not exceed fourteen years following
FDA approval.

Data Exclusivity:

TRIPS
Agreement

DR Law No. 20-00

DR-CAFTA

DR Law No. 424-06

Hatch Waxman
Act

Article 39.3:

Art. 179:

Art. 15.10:

Art. 32(1):

21 U.S.C. § 355:

Members, when
requiring, as a
condition of approving
the marketing of
pharmaceutical or of
agricultural chemical
products which utilizes
new chemical entities,
the submission of
undisclosed test or
other data, the
origination of which
involves a
considerable effort,
shall protect such data
against unfair
commercial use. In
addition, Members
shall protect such data
against disclosure,
except where
necessary to protect
the public, or unless
steps are taken to
ensure that the data
are protected against
unfair commercial use.

No data exclusivity but
contains unfair
commercial use
protection.

Parties are prohibited from
granting marketing approval
for a generic product that relies
on the originator’s data or
marketing approval for at least
five years from the date of
approval in the Party.

An applicant who files for
marketing approval for a
product containing a new
chemical entity or active moiety
receives data protection for at
least five years from the date of
approval of the product.
Regulatory approval may not be
granted to a second applicant
that relies on data supplied by
the first applicant. The Party
submitting marketing approval
information must seek approval
in the Dominican Republic
within five years of obtaining
marketing approval in another
territory.

An applicant who files for
marketing approval for a
product containing a new
chemical entity or active
moiety receives data
protection for five years
from the date of approval
of the product.
Regulatory approval may
not be granted to a
second applicant that
relies on data supplied by
the first applicant.

Where the marketing
authority requires the
presentation of secret
data or information,
these are protected from
unfair commercial use by
third parties. The secret
data or information is
protected against
disclosure. An exception
is when it is necessary to
protect the public or
when adequate measures
have been adopted to
ensure that the data or
information are
protected against their
unfair commercial use by
third parties.

A Party may require that the
person providing the
information in the other
territory seek approval in the
territory of the Party within
five years of obtaining
marketing approval in the
other territory.
Each Party shall protect such
undisclosed information
against disclosure except
where necessary to protect the
public. No Party may consider
information within the public
domain as undisclosed data. If
any undisclosed information
concerning safety and efficacy
information is disclosed, the
Party is still required to protect
such information from unfair
commercial use.
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The information will be
protected from disclosure,
except when necessary to
protect public health. No Party
may consider information within
the public domain as
undisclosed data. If any
undisclosed information
concerning safety and efficacy
information is disclosed, the
Party is still required to protect
such information from unfair
commercial use.

An applicant who files for
marketing approval for a
product containing a new
use or indication when
the applicant has
conducted essential, new
clinical trials receives data
protection for three
years.

Patent Linkage:

Trips
DR Law
DR-CAFTA
Agreement No. 20-00

DR Law No. 424-06

Hatch Waxman Act

None.

Art. 15.10.2(a):

Art. 32:

21 U.S.C. § 355

Parties shall implement
patent linkage systems in
their marketing approval
process to prevent a generic
from marketing a product
covered by a patent.

A drug manufacturer seeking marketing
approval of a new pharmaceutical
product must provide the government
with a list of patents that protect the
product or its approved use in the DR. The
Dominican government is charged with
establishing a public register listing the
patents that involve pharmaceutical
products.

New drug applications must include
patent information. Patent lists are
published in an online “Orange
Book.”

None.

The patent owner shall be
informed of the request and
the identity of any such other
person who requests approval
to enter the market during
the term of a patent identified
as claiming the approved
product or its approved use.

If a patent exists, marketing approval is
not allowed unless:
A.) A notarized sworn statement is
provided indicating that there is no
patent in effect in the Dominican
Republic protecting the product or
use;
B.) Written authorization is provided
from the patent holder;
C.) Or, a notarized sworn statement is
provided indicating that the
applicant shall not enter the market
prior to patent expiration.
The Dominican government is also
obligated to inform the patent holder of
the application and identify the person
seeking marketing approval during the life
of the patent.
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Under U.S. law, if a patent exists
there is a fourth option for generic
manufacturers that does not exist
under DR Law 424-06. Generics
may provide a statement by which
they challenge the patent validity or
application. Patent holders receive
a maximum 30-month stay of
marketing approval where generics
are challenging existing patents and
only if the patent holder initiates
litigation against generic applicants
within 45 days.
Generic applicants that successfully
challenge a patent receive 180 days
of exclusivity.

